What are the central claims of moral relativism? Is moral relativism a plausible meta-ethical theory? Answer with reference to both objections to the theory and defences of it.

Moral Relativism is a controversial topic both within philosophy and without. While in this essay I will not attempt to reconcile the different approaches to Morality, in particular those relating to Moral Relativism, I will, however, engage with the logic of Moral Relativism and provide an outline of the concept of Moral Relativism and the relation Moral Relativism has to meta-ethics.

Moral Relativism is not a single ‘theory’. One may validly speak of Moral Relativism and simply claim the empirical fact that different cultures, different societies, have different moral values and that these moral values are therefore relative to the given culture or society. It may be morally permissible for a South American farmer to maintain a beef cattle farm but the same practice would be immoral for a devout Hindu. While such a claim may indeed be true, it is of little consequence to the nature of morality, and this is what meta-ethics, the central theme of this essay, is focused upon (Ryan 2003, p. 385). In the study of ethics we are attempting to place a value judgment upon an act committed by an agent; ultimately we desire to claim that the act is either ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. From this perspective Meta-ethical Moral relativism (MMR) has two main propositions; (A) an act is only ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in relation to the moral codes and values of the society that the act is committed in, and (B) no universal moral principles govern all moral agents at all times (Harman 1975, p. 3).

Bernard Williams criticises Moral Relativism primarily from the position of (A) stating that it logically follows, from (A), that it is wrong for one to interfere with or judge the values of another society (Williams 1972, p. 34). For the purpose of this essay we shall call this new proposition (C). Williams claims that (C) does not hold in relation to Moral Relativism as it is dependant upon a non-relative definition of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’; that (C) is in fact a universal proposition (Williams 1972, p. 34).

Look at the following example. Imagine a possible world where two different societies exist. The first society (S1) is vegetarian and possesses the values of Moral Relativism presented by Williams. The other society (S2) is carnivorous and their main source of food is the new-born children of society S1. From the perspective of society S1, is it is not only morally permissible, but morally ‘right’, for society S2 to continue with their carnivorous habits and continue to consume the new-born children of society S1? From the position of (C) it is not logically consistent for a Morally Relative society, such as society S1, to make any sort of value judgment upon society S2, whether ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, without the judgment being a universal claim. It can only, therefore, be claimed that it is morally ‘right’ for society S1 not to attempt to change, nor judge, the moral values of society S2. From the Morally Relative position of society S1 there is no scope for the claim that it is ‘right’ for society S2 to consume the new-born children of society (S1).

This new proposition, (C), that Williams is presenting is the central claim of Normative Moral Relativism. When (C) is presented along with the propositions of MMR what results is known as Unsophisticated, or Vulgar, Relativism (PHI110: Philosophy, Morality and Society, Lecture Notes: Week Seven). Therefore, the criticism of Moral Relativism presented above cannot be applied to a strict reading of MMR as (C) is not an implicit proposition of MMR.

An interesting criticism of a stricter reading of MMR is presented by Nicholas Sturgeon and is a criticism of the argument from disagreement (Ryan 2003, p. 377). This criticism engages with proposition (A) of MMR presented above, namely that an act is only ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in relation to the moral codes and values of the society that the act is committed in. The argument from disagreement claims that the moral values of different societies are not reconcilable and hence Universalism must be false (Ryan 2003, p. 377). Sturgeon’s criticism claims that this proposition is ambiguous; that an act cannot at the same time be both ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. That to be unambiguous the proponent of MMR cannot avoid the universal claim that neither moral position is ‘right’, neither moral position is ‘wrong’, or that only one moral position is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ (Ryan 2003, pp. 377-378).

This need not necessarily be the case however. Proposition (A) and the argument from disagreement may indeed be flawed from the position of Individualistic Moral Relativism, the claim that moral judgments rest solely with the individual, where in a single spatial location there exists plural competing moralities¹. Proposition (A) and the argument from disagreement are semantically and logically coherent, however, when the moral values are possessed by different societies in different spatial locations (Ryan 2003, p. 380).

In defence of MMR an approach known as functionalism is often used. Functionalism claims that certain moral beliefs are necessary for a given society, as it actually is, to function; that these beliefs are relative to the given society only and need not possess any moral value in any other society (Tasioulas 1998, p. 192). The empirical fact, however, that a particular moral value is necessary for a given society, as it actually is, to function does not, in itself, make that moral value ‘right’. If we think back to the example of the possible world presented above we see it is necessary that for society S2 to function, as it
actually is, it must continue to consume the new-born children of society S1. This does not, however, justify the individual moral values for society S2, such as that the new-born children of society S1 are the best source of nutrition. Just because Society S2 exists, as it actually is, does not provide moral justification for the preservation of any of Society S2’s moral values. This justification depends upon the moral validity of the acts of the agent, or in this case, the society (Wong 1991, p. 443).

The proponent of MMR may see such a discussion of the merits, or lack there of, of MMR as leaning towards an extreme interpretation. Wong (1991, pp. 446-447) outlines a more conservative approach to Moral Relativism illustrating the possible reasons and motivations individuals and societies possess towards holding moral values. Wong has two intentions here. Primarily, he is seeking reasons for moral values that may be similar between individuals or societies even if the moral action is different. Wong uses an example from Herodotus juxtaposing the moral actions of two societies, Greeks and Indians, in relation to the treatment of their deceased fathers. While the two societies committed different moral actions relating to the treatment of their deceased fathers they both, seemingly, had the same underlying motivation (Wong 1991, pp. 443-444, 446).

Secondly, Wong doesn’t propose the search for a single ‘true’ morality but rather a ‘more justified morality’; this leaves open the possibility that some moral theories may indeed be false (Wong 1991, p. 446). Wong presents this proposition from a very functionalist perspective intending that morality is based upon reasons that benefit the moral agent. Wong does attempt to include reasons that benefit, or at least recognise the interests of, others in his proposition but he provides no argument why this may, perhaps must, be the case. If Wong is here arguing from a Kantian perspective, that reason itself is motivation enough to determine, and uphold, valid moral values; or even from a Humean perspective, that the reasons for the moral values have their motivation in the values and goals of the agent, then this proposition, too, may be seen as a universal claim. For such a claim to hold, reason must be a universal condition that is appealed to by the Moral Relativist, or reason must be imposed upon the moral agent that doesn’t possess it. Even though Foucault ‘cut off the King’s head’ and it’s since been replaced with reason, it is likely that moral values exist that don’t rely upon reason, or reason alone, for their justification, especially moralities that exist in a different temporal location (Hindess 1995, pp. 131-132).

Moral Relativism is certainly not a finely polished nor flawless theory; however, many of the criticisms levelled against it are not complete in themselves. We have seen that Bernard Williams’ criticism is aimed at an extreme reading of Moral Relativism known as Vulgar Moral Relativism and is not strictly relevant to what is known as MMR. Nicholas Sturgeon’s criticism is indeed more relevant but, as we have seen, can not be applied to all occurrences of MMR. Even though the defences of MMR presented above may not be without some error they can be presented as coherent and logical. MMR is not concerned with reconciling or mediating the problems faced between two, or more, moral agents, but is concerned with uncovering the truth behind moral claims. Even with all the objections, MMR can be presented as a coherent and logical thesis, and as such, is a valid meta-ethical theory.

1453 Words.

1. James Ryan (2003, p. 385) doesn’t think that this is a flaw but describes it as an unfortunate social problem.

References

Harman, G 1975, ‘Moral Relativism Defended’, in The Philosophical Review, vol. 84, no. 1, Cornell University Press, pp. 3-22.

Hindess, B 1995, Discourses of Power: From Hobes to Foucault, Blackwell, Oxford.

PHI110: Philosophy, Morality and Society, Lecture Notes: Week Seven, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW.

Ryan, J.A 2003, ‘Moral Relativism and the Argument from Disagreement’, in Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 34, no. 3, Blackwell, pp. 377-386.

Tasioulas, J 1998, ‘Consequences of Ethical Relativism’, in European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 6, no. 2, Blackwell, pp. 172-202.

Williams, B 1972, Morality: an Introduction to Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne.

Wong, D 1991, ‘Relativism’, in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 441-450.